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  The purpose of this  paper is to examine the association between corporate governance and 
Intellectual capital in the pharmaceutical companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange over 
the period 2004-2009 using a regression based model. The study investigates the impacts of 
three  some  independent  variables  of  the  corporate  governance  (i.e.  the  number  of  board 
members, the relative extent of nonexecutive to executive directors, the auditing committee). 
The results suggest that corporate governance had no special effect on intellectual capital in the 
pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore among corporate governance's variables, the first one 
(i.e. board size) had negative impact on firms' intellectual capital and the second and the third 
variables had no effects on intellectual capital. 
 © 2014 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.  
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1. Introduction 
 
During  the  past few  years, there  have  been  tremendous efforts on  learning  more  about  different 
factors influencing the performance of firms listed on various stock exchanges (Ballas et al. 2012; 
Chau & Leung, 2006; Chi & Wang, 2010; Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Intellectual capital is an 
intangible asset taken into account as a competitive advantage for different firms and it can extend the 
market share through the necessary knowledge and resources (Lu et al., 2010). Intellectual capital can 
also be considered as a valuable source for measuring the firms’ growth. Corporate governance, on 
the other hand, plays essential role on making important investment decisions and there are literally 
various  studies  associated  with  the  effects  of  corporate  governance  on  different  items  such  as 
intellectual capital.  
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Hentati and Jilani (2013) analyzed the determinants of non-audit-fees for a sample of some French 
firms belonging to the SBF 120 index over the period 2005-2007. In this study, the attention focused 
on the effect of shareholder/creditor agency expenses such as debts and investment opportunities. 
They reported that the affiliation of the auditor to an international network, the presence of an audit 
committee, the debt, the size of the company and the closing date had an impact on non-audit fees. 
However, investment opportunities did not influence the amount of non-audit fees. 
 
According to Emamgholipour et al. (2013), institutional investors play important role on formation of 
various  changes  on  corporate  governance  systems.  They  can  significantly  influence  on  firms  by 
carefully looking into the performance of management and limiting their opportunistic behaviors and 
manipulating their financial statements. They studied the relationship between institutional investors 
and earnings management on some listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange by investigating a 
sample of 700 firm-years data over the period 2006-2010. They reported that there was a positive and 
significant relationship between institutional investors and earnings management and recommended 
that  increasing  the  ownership  percentage  of  institutional  shareholders  could  increase  earnings 
management.  
 
Rouhi and Khalifehsultani (2012) performed an investigation on relationship between moral hazard 
and  corporate  governance  with  earning  forecast  quality  in  the  Tehran  Stock  Exchange.  They 
concluded that moral hazard did not impact forecasted earning, significantly. However, there was a 
meaningful relationship between forecasted earning and quality of earning.  
 
Valahzaghard and Salehi (2012) studied the effect of the corporate governance characteristics and 
ownership on earnings quality among some Iranian private banks. In their  survey,  among various 
factors, the effect of big five shareholder were considered to be significant and positive on earning 
quality. Besides, the impact of one variable regression test disclosed that institutional ownership had 
positive impact on earning quality. However, the effects of other variables including percentage of 
ownership concentration, the size of board of directors, reliance on debt, logarithm of sum of assets, 
return of assets, logarithm of operating cash flow on earning quality were not meaningful. The result 
of this survey indicated that institutional ownership played an important role earning quality simply 
because institutions normally had the access on professionals to control management. 
 
Nassreddine and Anis (2012) determined the mental models of actors in the firm with respect to the 
stakeholder approach of corporate governance. They used the cognitive map to view these diagrams 
to show the ways of thinking and conceptualization of the stakeholder approach. The paper also took 
a corporate governance perspective, discussed stakeholder model. 
 
2. The proposed study 
 
The proposed study of this paper considers the following three hypotheses on Intellectual capital (IC), 
 
1.  First hypothesis: board size influences on the IC indexes  
2.  Second hypothesis: The proportion of non-executive members to executive member of the 
board influences on the IC indexes  
3.  Third hypothesis: The auditing committee influences on the IC indexes 
In this research, IC is considered as a dependent variable and corporate governance (CG) mechanisms 
components including the number of the board, the percent of non-executive members to executive 
members in the board as well as the auditing committee are considered as independent variables. IN 
addition, return on assets (ROA) and total assets to stockholder’s equity and natural logarithm of 
annual sale are considered as control variables. This study deals with testing the effect of corporate 
governance  on  intellectual  capital  and  tries  to develop practical  knowledge  about  the  quality  of R. Alizadeh et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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relationships  and  effectiveness  between  them,  so  the  study  is  considered  as  an  applied  and 
descriptive-survey type. 
All the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) comprised the population of 
this study. For sampling the firms only with these four characteristics were selected.  
1) The end of their financial year would be in March, which is the end of the year in Iran. 
2) The shares of the firms must have been traded on TSE over the period 2004- 2009. 
 3) There should not be any changes on the financial over the period 2004- 2009. 
 4) The required information should be available. 
Considering above limitations, 28 firms were selected as sample for 6 year; so it is equivalent to 168 
year-firm 8 Data collection and analysis. 
In this study, because of doing field analysis and dealing with the real data of the pharmaceutical 
firms accepted in TSE, by due attention to research variables, data were collected from these firms, 
income  statements  by  different  sources  for  example:  compact  disk  of  Tehran  stock  exchange 
organization, related software's such as Tadbir pardaz and Rahavar navin and Informative sits of 
stock exchange organization. After totalizing and doing required calculation by Excell software, It 
has been ready for analysis. Final analysis has done by Eviews software. For testing the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms on intellectual capital, the following regression model is used,  
ICi,t = β0+ β1 BRDSIZEi,t + β2 NONEXECi,t to EXECi,t + β3 AUDi,t+ β4NLSi,t+ β5ROAi, t 
Where IC is the Intellectual Capital, BRDSIZE represents board size, NONEXEC to EXEC denotes 
the proportion of non-executive members to  executive members of the board, AUD is a dummy 
variable, which is equal to one if firm’s auditing committee do the auditing affairs of the firm, and 
zero, otherwise. In addition, NLS is the natural logarithm of annual sale, ROA represents return on 
assets and β denotes the variables’ coefficient 
3. The results 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
For analyzing the basic characteristics of  variables, it  is  necessary to  identify the sample and to 
become familiar with descriptive indicator related to variables. Table 1 demonstrates the summary of 
the descriptive statistics of the research variables including mean, median and variation parameters as 
variance, standard deviation and skewness of the variables. 
Table 1  
The Results of descriptive indicators 
Variable Type  variable  mean  median  variance  Standard deviation  skewness 
Dependent  IC  15.082  6.476  2860.653  53.485  5.487 
Independent  Board size  5.047  5  0.069  0.0263  4.069 
  NON EXEX to EXEC  0.466  0.25  0.141  0.376  1.616 
  AUD  0.178  0  0.147  0.384  1.693 
Control  ROA  0.225  0.224  0.010  0.101  0.298 
  Ln Sales  5.5  5.474  0.117  0.342  -0.09 
 
3.2. Inferential statistics 
The results of these research hypotheses are presented in Table 2 as follows,   184
Table 2  
The results of compound regression test 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Deviation  T-value  PROB  Relationship  Significance Level 
IC  -34.22219  7.947682  -4.305  0.000  Negative  99% 
BRDSIZE  -1.319498  0.506512  -2.605  0.010  Negative  951% 
NONEXEC TO 
EXEC 
0.319705  0.509405  0.62760  0.531  No relation  - 
AUD  0.531480  0.504010  1.05450  0.294  No relation  - 
NLS  10.77507  1.380322  7.80619  0.000  Positive  99% 
ROA  13.11084  2.447006  5.35791  0.000  Positive  99% 
 
Determinate 
coefficient 
Adjusted 
Determinate 
Coefficient 
Mean Deviation 
Of regression 
f-value  F probability  D-W 
Weighted 
Quantities 
0.967503  0.956145  57.604453  85.182  0.000000  2.391105 
Non-weighted 
quantities 
0.978757  --  --  --  --  2.315910 
 
3.3. Testing hypotheses 
3.3.1. The first hypothesis 
The first hypothesis of the survey investigates whether there is a meaningful relationship between 
board size and intellectual capital of the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange or 
not. 
H01)  There is  not  any meaningful  relationship  between board  size  and Intellectual  capital of the 
pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange. 
H01: Bi =0 
H11)  There  is  a  meaningful  relationship  between  board  size  and  Intellectual  capital  of  the 
pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange. 
H11: Bi ≠o 
As shown in Table 2, the variable coefficient of board size is -1.316498. According to t-statistic and 
p-value of this variable, we conclude that the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. So board size 
has negative meaningful relation with intellectual capital and H1 assumption of the first hypothesis is 
accepted.  
3.3.2. The second hypothesis  
The second hypothesis of the survey investigates whether the proportion of non- executive members 
to executive members of the board has a meaningful relationship with intellectual capital of the 
pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange. 
H02) The proportion of non- executive members to executive members of the board doesn’t have a 
meaningful relationship with Intellectual capital of the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock 
Exchange. 
H02: Bi= 0 
H12) The proportion of non- executive members to executive members of the board has a meaningful 
relationship with Intellectual capital of the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange. 
H12: Bi≠0 R. Alizadeh et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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As  shown  in  Table  2  the  variable  coefficient  of  the  proportion  of  non-  executive  members  to 
executive members is 0.319705. According to t-statistic and p-value of this variable, we conclude that 
the coefficient is not significant at the 0.10 error- level. So H0 assumption of the second hypothesis is 
accepted. 
3.3.3 The third hypothesis  
The third hypothesis of the survey investigates whether there is a meaningful relationship between 
firm’s auditing committee and intellectual capital of the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran 
stock Exchange. 
H03) There is not any meaningful relationship between firm’s auditing committee and Intellectual 
capital of the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange. 
H03: Bi =0 
H13) There is a meaningful relationship between firm’s auditing committee and Intellectual capital of 
the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange. 
H13: Bi 
As shown in Table 2 the variable coefficient of auditing committee (AUD) is equal to 0.531480. 
According to t-statistic and p-value of this variable, we conclude that the coefficient is not significant 
at the 0.10 error- level. So H0 assumption of the third hypothesis is accepted.  
3.3.4. The Impacts of control variables analysis 
Analyzing the impacts of control variables, existed in main model are as follows, 
Return  on assets  (ROA)  and natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  have  meaningful  relationship  with 
intellectual capital of the pharmaceutical firms accepted in Tehran stock Exchange when the level of 
significance is one percent. Therefore, we conclude that the greater a firm’s  ROA and total assets, 
the more is its intellectual capital. 
4. Conclusion 
According to this study corporate governance components have no special impact on pharmaceutical 
firm’s intellectual capital. So firm’s governors should reinforce their old and weak principles, wisely. 
By  renewing  these  principles,  they  can  be  effective  on  intellectual  caption  as  shown  in  related 
research. In recent decade, firms pay special attention to measuring intellectual capital to inform their 
beneficiaries.  They want to find  methods  for  evaluating  internal  intangible  assets and  extracting 
imperceptible values  in  organizations. In  fact  intellectual  caption  provides  a  new  comprehensive 
model  for  observing  the  real  value  of  organizations  and  calculating  firm’s  future  value  and 
performance. The following suggestions could made based on the results of the survey, 
1-  The proposed model of this paper seems to be useful tool for firms to provide, to present and 
to analyze real and comprehensive financial statements in accounting system and to make 
good decisions for their future investments (buying other firm’s equity) 
2-  This model is useful for investors and stock holders to have a real and correct measuring of 
now and future value of the firms (based on IC) for acquiring greater financial performance in 
future.  
3-  Because  of  extension  in  firms’  activities  and  having  need  for  specialized managers,  it  is 
recommended that firm’s managing director be separated from board of directors in order to 
prevent any vagueness in these two institutions’ duties and governing the firms. As well it is   186
useful  for  reinforcing  the  responsiveness  culture  and enhancing  information  clarity  in the 
firms and economical units. Because their assets are provided by a lot of stakeholders. 
4-  Because of the important role of non-executive members of the board in governing the firms, 
it is recommended that stakeholders and board members be more familiar to their supervisory 
role. Furthermore these non-executive members should be more knowledgeable about their 
duties  towards  forming  different  committees  (i.e.  auditing  committee,  appointment 
committee…) and their special reports in order to be more effective in governing the firms. 
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